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The Folly  of Unfair  Trade  Cases
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The main  effect  of  antidumping  actions  brought  against  Brazilian
producers of frozen concentrated  orange juice has been to
strengthen  the oligopoly-oligopsony  relationship  between  Bra-
zilian  producers  and  their  U.S.  partners.  This  limits  the  prospects
for competition in the world market for frozen con,entrated
orange  juice.
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This  paper  - a product  of the Trade  Policy  Division,  Country  Economics  Department  - is part of a larger  effort in
PRE  to understand  the economics  of the emergence  of "fairness"  as a standard  for regulating  international  trade,  its
implications  for the continued  openness  of the international  trading  system, and its continued  functioning  as an
important  vehicle  for  development.  Copies  are availabe  free  from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW,  Washington,
DC 20433. Please  contact  Nellie T. Artis,  room  N1O-013,  extension  37947  (46 pages).
From 1965  to 1976,  the United  States  was a net  was guilty  of unfair trade  practices  until  proven
exporter  of frozen  concentrated  orange  juice; since  innocent.
the 1977  freeze  in Florida,  it has been  a net importer.
In 1978,  the price differential  between  the Florida  and  When U.S.  firms accused  Brazilian  producers  of
Brazilian  concentrates  cxceeded  the tariff  wedge  and  unfair trade,  the Brazilian  producers  were in a bind:
the Brazilian  prn  . ict began to displace  U.S.  produc-  the imbalance  between  their  production  costs  and sale
tion and, indirectly,  Florida-grown  oranges.  prices was the result mainly  of an exceptional  lack of
coordination  among  Brazilian  frms struggling  to
Brazil  dominates  the international  market  for  secure  stable  input  supplies. But it was seized  upon
frozen  concentrated  orange  juice. By the mid-1980s,  by foreign  producers  as unfair trade. In 1986,  the
Brazil  accounted  for about 80 percent  of world  Brazilian  industry  was  accused  of dumping  by both
exports  of the product. Brazilian  producers  supplied  the United  States  and Australia. And unfair  trade
more  than 94 percent  of U.S.  imports  of the product  procedures  in the United  States,  once initiated,  have  a
in the 1980s  and accounted  for 50 percent  of sales in  high  probability  of resulting  in an affirnative
the U.S.  market. Brazil  is also the main  supplier  in  decision.
the European  Community.
Unfair  trade cases  against Brazilian  firms have
The Brazilian  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  had little  direct impact  on output  or price levels. But
industry  has been  able to expand  rapidly  despite  apparently  they promote  oligopolistic  coordination
heavy  protection  in its major  markets  - especially  among  Brazilian  firms. To the extent that  these unfair
the United  States  - and erratic  changes  in Brazilian  trade  cases foster  the market  power  of Brazilian
policics  at all levels. The dynamism  of the Brazilian  frozen  concentrate  producers,  they increase  the
industry  is attributable  to Brazil's comparative  likelihood  of increased  long-term  welfare  costs to
advantage  and to the series  of climate  shocks  to  consumers  worldwide.
Florida's orange  groves.
Unfair  trade  actions have  had a particularly
In Brazil,  the industry  is largely  in the hands  of  negative  impact  on their supposed  beneficiary,  the
four large firms  - who sell 80 percent  of their  U.S.  citrus industry. The anddumping  cases were
products  to a few  large  U.S. firms (Coca  Cola,  Procter  basically  used to protect  orange  growers  and higher-
& Gamble,  Tropicana,  Pasco,  and Beatrice),  at  cost frozen  concentrate  producers  at the expense  of
significant  price  rebates.  U.S.  juice and soft drink  processors  and distributors
linked  by marketing  arrangements  to Brazilian
Florida  orange  growers,  beset  by import  competi-  concentrate  exporters. Their  effect has probably  been
tion and climate  shocks,  tumed  to unfair  trade laws  to strengthen  the oligopoly-oligopsony  relationship
for protection  in the early 1980s,  relying  on them  between  Brazilian  producers  and their  U.S. partners,
increasingly  as a substitute  for safeguard  actions.  further  hindering  the prospects  for competition  in the
Because  of Brazil's interventionist  trade  policies,  the  world  market  for frozen  concentrated  orange  juice.
prevailing  U.S.  belief was that  any Brazilian  industry
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Nlotes  ......  ..  ..  ..  ..........  . 43Brazilian  Frozen  Concentrated  Orange  Juice:
A Study  on the  Folly  of UnfaLr  Trade  Case,
Carlos  Alberto  Primo  Braga
Simao  Davi Silber
Brazil  has  been the  world's  leading  exporter  of frozen  concentrated
orange  juice  since  the late 19609.  The  origins  of the  Brazilian  industry  go
back to 1963,  when the first  modern  plant  for  processing  frozen  concentrate
was built  in the  state  of Sao  Paulo.  Since  then,  the industry  has  grown
dramatically  as the  international  market  for  frozen  concentrate  has  expanded.
Between  1963-67  and 1983-87,  Brazilian  exports  grew  at an average  yearly  rate
of  33.9  percent.
Only four  decades  ago, orange  juice  was a seasonal  product  and  a  luxury
good.  Advances  in processing  and  packaging  technologies  transformed  orange
juice  as a commodity  and  revolutionized  the  economy  of the  citrus  sector
across  the  world.  As the  taste  and  quality  of  processed  juice  products
improved,  they  were rapidly  substituted  for ^resh  citrus  products  in
industrial  countries.  In the  United  States,  for  example,  processed  citrus
products  accounted  for  63 percent  of per  capita  citrus  consumption  by 1960,  up
from 17  percent  in 1940 (FAO  1989a,  1-2).
The  Brazilian  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  industry  emerged  in
response  to this  growing  international  demand  for  orange  juice.  The Biazilia.
industry,  which produces  a highly  concentrated  form  of frozen  juice (usually,
65 degrees  Brix')  primarily  for  manufacturing,  grew rapidly  throughout  the
1960s  and 1970s,  playing  a  complementary  role  to the  Florida  processing
industry.  Its expansion  was geared  largely  to the  needs  of the  European
market.
In the 1980s,  however,  several  events  significantly  altered  the
international  stature  and  market  orientation  of the  Brazilian  industry.  First,
several  severe  freezes  in Florida  damaged  much of the  citrus  crop,  allowing
the  Brazilian  industry  to overtake  the  Florida  producers.  Brazil  not only
expanded  its  market  share  in the  United  States  and  in other  major importing
- 1-regions,  but it  also  became  the largest  world  producer  of frozen  concentrated
orange  juice.  Second,  developments  in transport  (bulk  shipping)  and  storage
techniques  (tank  farms)  began  to affect  traditional  distribution  networks  and
to reduce  the  market  power  of Florida  processors  in the  U.S.  market  (McClain
1989).
In response,  Florida  orange  growers  and segments  of  the  U.S. frozen
concentrate  industry  increasingly  demanded  protection  against  foreign
competition.  A series  of unfair  trade  actions  were initiated  against  Brazilian
producers  during  the 1980.  as a safeguard  device  for  local  producers.  While
these  actions  had  only  a marginal  impact  on the  output  and  price  levels  of
Brazilian  producers,  they  created  incentives  for  oligopolistic  coordination
among  Brazilian  firms.  To the  extent  that  these  unfair  trade  cases  fostered
rather  than  inhibited  the  market  power  of  Brazilian  producers,  they increased
long-term  welfare  costs  for  consumers  around  the  world.  This  chapter  analyzes
the  hietory  of these  unfair  trade  cases  and their  impact  on the  Brazilian
frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  industry.
Growth  of  the  Brazilian  citrus  industry
The  history  of the  Brazilian  citrus  and  frozen  concentrate  industry  can
be divided  in three  periods.  From  the  beginning  of this  century  until  the
1960.,  the  citrus  industry  produced  mainly  for  the  fresh  fruit  market.
Brazilian  orange  exports  to  Argentina  in the  second  decade  of the 1900s  and  to
Europe  in the 1920.  suggest  the  early  outward-orientation  of the industry. 2
The  main producing  areas  in the  country  were the  states  of Rio  de Janeiro  and
Sao  Paulo  and  the city  of Rio  de Janeiro.  Sao  Paulo,  however,  rapidly  assumed
a leading  role  because  of its  superior  natural-resources  endowment  and
infrastructure  and  because  of direct  support  from  the  state  government,  which
began  to sponsor  citrus-related  research  in the 1920s.
With the  Great  Depression  and  the  crisis  in  the  coffee  sector  in the
1930s,  farmers  in Sao  Paulo  began  to  move into  oranges  as an alternative  crop.
- 2 -Their  export  share  grow  from  12  percent  of  total  Brazilian  exportb  of  359,000
boxes  (40.8  kilograms  each)  in  1927  to  50  percent  (  of  59601,900  box.s)  by
1939.  In  the  late  M3es,  however,  citr.s  production  In  the  state  was  almost
completely  wiped  out  by  the  citrus  disease  known  as  "tristeza."  Not  until  1957
did  Sao  Paulo  recover  its  leading  position  in  Brazil's  citrus  industry.'
The  second  period  in  In  the  history  of  the  industry  began  with  the
opening  of  the  first  frozen  concentrate  processing  plant  in  the  city  of
Bebedouro,  Sao  Paulo,  in  1962.  This  first  plant  --  little  more  than  a  cottage
operation  --  was  soon  followed  by  several  larger  ones  in  1963,  1964,  and  1965,
also  in  Sao  Paulo.  These  investments  in  processing  activities  were  motivated
by  the  growing  international  demand  for  orange  juice,  che  1962  freeze  in
Florida,  and  expanding  citrus  production  in  Sao  Paulo.
Most  of  the  capital  invested  in  these  plants  came  from  firms  and
entrepreneurs  involved  in  exporting  or  importing  fresh  fruit  or  from  firms  in
the  beverage  industry  in  the  United  States  and  Europe.  The  Suconasa  processing
plant  in  Araraquara,  for  instance,  Was owned  by  a  Puerto  Rican  entrepreneur
(Pedro  Santiago)  who  was  the  first  to  perceive  the  potential  of  a  Brazilian-
based  operation  to  supply  the  U.S.  market.  In  1967,  Suconasa  was  acquirre  1Kv
Jose  Cutrale,  Jr.,  a  major  Brazilian  orange  grower  and  exporter,  and  bek -a
Sucocitrico  Cutrale  S.A.,  soon  to  be  one  of  the  giants  of  the  industry.
Citrosuco  Paulista  S.A.  in  Hatao  was  the  result  of  an  association  among  the
Pasco  Packing  Company  (a  U.S.  juice  producer),  the  Ecks  Group  (a  major  German
orange  juice  importer),  and  Carl  Fisher  (a  German  immigrant,  who  had  a  fruit
export  company  in  Brazil).
Desptte  many  initial  problems,  particularly,  with  quality  control,  the
Brazilian  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  industry  expanded  rapidly  (see
tables  6.1  and  6.2).  And,  in  turn,  so  did  Brazil's  citrus  sector.  Between  1963
and  1967,  only  12  percent  of  the  oranges  grown  in  Sao  Paulo  were  processed
(Ferreira  and  Larson  1973,  13);  by  the  first  half  of  the  1970s,  that  share  had
increased  to  62  percent  and  soon  reached  more  than  80  percent,  where  it  has
remained.
3-In  the  aid-1970s,  Brazilian  frozen  concentrate  processcrs  experienced
their  first  systemic  crisis.  The  worldwide  recession  following  the  first  oil
price  6.  Jck  In  1973  depressed  international  demand  for  frozen  orange  juice
concentrate,  pushing  prices  down  by 17  percent  between  1974  and  1975.  The
financial  implications  of  this  price  drop  were  magnified  by  events  in  the
Brazilian  orange  market.  Some  Brazilian  processors  were  offering  unusually
high  prices  for  the  1974/75 orange  crop  because  of  the  aggressive  behaviQ.v  of
the  Italian  firm  of  Sandurson,  which  had  acquired  complete  control  of  the  Cia.
Mineirs  de  Conservas  processing  plant  in  1970.  The  neu  company,  Sanderson
S.A.,  had  ambitious  expansion  plans,  and  in  Date  1973  it  began  to  bid  up  the
price  of  oranges  for  future  delivery.  But  as  the  world  price  of  frozen
concentrate  fell,  the  company  was  unable  to  honor  its  commitments  and  filed
for  bankruptcy  in  mid-1974.
Orange  growers  and  some  processing  firms  sought  government  intervention
in  the  sector.  Some  also  accused  Citrosuco  of  dumping  frozen  concentrated
orange  juice  on  international  markets  and  magnifying  the  price  fall.  The
government  finally  intervened  in  July  1974  (described  in  detail  in  the
following  section).  But  its  imposition  of  a  minimum  export  price  for  frozen
concentrate  and  a  minimum  price  for  oranges  --  as  well  as  the  suopension  of
Citrosuco's  export  licenses  until  December  1974  --  did  not help  the sector.
The  decreased  demand  for  oranges  resulting  from  the  suspension  of  Citrosuco's
licenses  and  the  bankruptcy  of  Sanderson  further  depressed  orange  prices,
despite  the  government'e  attempts  to  regulate  the  industry.
The  contemporary  induetrial  structure  of  the  citrus  processing  sector
emerged  from  the crisis  of 1974.  In 1975,  the state  government  of Sao  Paulo
expropriated  tkhe  industrial  assets  of  bankrupt  Sanderson  and  reorganized  the
company,  which  returned  to  production  in  the  1975/76  season  as  Fruteep.  In
1977,  Coopercitrus,  a  cooperative  of  orange  growers,  acquired  control  of
Fruteep.  Several  smaller  companies  hurt  by  the  crisis  were  acquired  by
Citrosuco  and  Cutrale,  thereby  increasing  the  concentration  of  the  industry.
-4-And finally,  Cargill"n  acquisition  of Citrobrasil  in 1976  marked  the  arrival
of a  major new  player  in the  industry.
In 1977,  a  freezi  in Florida  initi  ted  a period  of  much higher  world
prices  for  frozen  concentrated  orange  jul;e  (table  6.3).  By 1978,  average
wholesale  prices  for  frozen  concentrate  in tle  U.S.  market  had increased  by
roughly  71 percent  over 1976  levels  (Irias  1981,  20).  Brazilian  companies
responded  rapidly,  expanding  their  production  and increasing  their  exports  to
the  U.S.  market.  The  U.S. share  of Brazil's  exports  of frozen  concentrated
orange  juice  increased  from  an average  of 14  percent  during  1970-76  to 22
lercent  in 1977  and  44 percent  in 1978.  By 1978,  the  United  States  was the
largest  importer  of Brazilian  concentrate.'
The  climate  shocks  suffered  by the  Florida  orange  crops  in the 1980a
were the  primary  factor  that  shaped  this third  stage  of development  of the
Brazilian  citrus  industry.  The  United  States  became  a net importer  of frozen
concentrated  orange  juice,  and  Brazil  became  the  dominant  world  producer,
largely  because  of its  increasing  share  in the  U.S.  market  (table  6.4).  At the
beginning  of the decade,  Brazilian  processors  had  produced  the  equivalent  of
91  percent  of Florida's  frozen  concentrate  output;  by the  second  half of  the
19809,  Florida's  production  represented  less  than  £0 percent  of Brazil's
output.
The  Brazilian  frozen  concentrated  orange  *e  industry  also increased
its  share  in the country's  total  exports,  from  0.5  percent  in 1970  to 4.7
percent  in the  1980s.  The  industry's  share  in the  economy  as a  whole is  much
smaller,  however.  Even  after  two  decades  of rapid  growth,  industry  revenues
are equivalent  to only  0.56  percent  of Brazil's  GDP,  a reflection  of the
strong  outward-orientation  of the  sector.  The industry  has a  much greater
relevance  to the economy  of the  state  of Sao  Paulo,  however,  since  most (96
percent)  of Brazil's  processing  capacity  is located  there,  and  citrus-related
activities  employ  an estimated  150,000  workers  in the  statA.
-5-Brazilian  economlc  policies  antd  the citrus  ivlustry
Government  policies  have also affected the citrus industry, although
they  have  not been directly  responsible  for  its  phenomenal  growth.  Both  broad
economic  policies,  such  as export  and agricultural  subsidies  and  exchange  rate
management,  and sictoral  interventions  had  an effect  on the  economic
performance  of the industry.  But  the  picture  that emerges  from  an analysis  of
these  policies  is at best  mixed.  Although  the  industry  profited  from  export
subsidies  and  domestic  incentives  in the 1970s,  the  overall  impact  of
government  policies  has  not always  been favorable  to the  sector,  particularly
in the 1980s.  It is quite  clear,  however,  that  sector-oriented  policies  were
not  designed  to foster  competition  among  frozen  concentrate  producer&  in
Brazil,  and  in fact  they  tended  to reinforce  the  oligopolistic  structure  of
the  industry.
Trade  pollcles  ana  the  macroeconomic  environment
Over  the last  three  decades,  Brazil's  economic  policies  have  often
fostered  import  substitution-based  industrialization  and appreciation  of the
real exchange  rate,  which created  an economic  bias  against  exports.'
Macroecoromic  imbalances  have  been the  norm  rather  than the  exception,  as the
upward  trend  in the inflation  rate  since  the  early  1970s  and  in the  current
account  deficit  up to the  early  1980s  suggests  (table  6.5).
The  major  exception  to these  policies  occurred  during  1964-73,  when the
government  followed  a consistent  set  of  macroeconomic  policies  that  controlled
inflation  and a trade  liberalization  program  that  diminished  the  antiexport
bias of the  economy.  With the first  oil shock,  however,  the  government
introduced  an ambitious  import  substitution  program  directed  at basic
industrial  inputs  and  capital  goods.  This  program  raised  the  cost  of domestic
inputs  and  reduced  the  competitiveness  of Brazilian  exports.  The situation  was
aggravated  by an exchange  rate  policy,  based  on a naive  purchasing  power
parity  criterion,  that  did  not take  into  account  adverse  p:ice  shocks.  To
-6-reduce  the  antisxport  bisa  of  these  policies,  the  government  relied  mainly  on
export  subaidies.
Under  external  pressure  in  the  early  1980s,  Brazil  began  to  substitute
real  exchange  rate  adjustments  for  export  subsidies.  The  overall  trade  policv,
however,  remained  highly  protectclciist  as  Imports  were  curlad  through  a
growing  array  of  nontariff  barriers.  Eventually,  the  folly  of  this  strategy
Was  recognized,  and  by 1988  a  trade  liberalization  movement  began  to  gather
support.  In  1990,  the  Collor  administration  announced  a  major  liberalization
eff  rt,  beginning  with  the  abolition  of  most  nontariff  barriers.  Ironically,
however,  macroeconomic  disturbances  and  government  intervention  have  induced  a
significant  appreciation  of  the  domestic  currency  over  the  last  few  years
(table  6  5),  counteracting  the  positive  impact  of  the  trade  liberaligation  for
enporters.
The  antiexport  bias  resulting  from  the  import  subatitution  strategies  of
the  Brazilian  government  has  not  been  a  major  obstacle  to  expansion  of  the
frozen  concentrate  industry,  however.  Historically,  oranges  have  represented
roughly  65  percent  of  the  processing  cobcs  of  the  Brazilian  frozen  concentrate
industry  (Martinelli  1989,  310).  For  a  typical  Brazilian  orange  grove,
tradables  such  as  fertilizers  and  pesticides  account  for  as  much  as  50  percent
of  production  costs  (Amaro,  Yamaguishi,  and  Barros  1983,  11).  Yet  despite
government  policies  that  raised  the  domestic  prices  of  tradables  above  their
international  level,  the  burden  of  these  higher  domestic  costs  has  fluctuated.
Price  controls  were  often  applied  to  agricultural  inputs,  and  subsidized
credit  programs  during  the !F!i/Os  substantially  reduced  the  real  cost of some
critical  inputs  for  the  sector  (Irias  1981).  And  given  Brazil's  chronic  high
inflation,  relative  prices  sometimes  even  changed  in  favor  of  orange
producers.
There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that  the  citrus  sector  ',as  been  heavily
taxed  by  the  overvaluation  of  the  domestic  currency,  although  the  overall
impact  of  this  distortion  has  depended  on  the  effects  of  other  government
policies  as  well.  During  the  1970e,  the  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice
-7-industry  and  other  export  industries  had  accese  ta  a  wide  array  of  incentives.
These  benefit.  included  tax credit@,  exemptions  from  state  and  federal  value
added  taxes  and  from  corporate  income  taxes  on  export-related  profits,  and
subsidized  lines  of  credit  for  investment  and  for  operational  financing  of
export  activities.  Martone  and  Prim*  Braga  (1988)  have  shown  that,  for  export
activities  in  general,  these  incentives  outweighed  the  disincentive  effects  of
the  overvalued  cruzeiro  In  the  1970s,  The  citrus  sector  also  benefited  from
various  agricultural  support  programs,  including  subsidized  credit  for
fertilizer  purchases  and,  until  1976,  fiscal  incentives  for  reforestation
projects  .6
All  in  all,  the  net  imp.t of  the  my  -roeconomic  et  I.ronment  and  of  trade
and  exchange  rate  policies  was  favorable  te  the  citrus  sector  in  the  1970s.
But  as  the  distortions  in  the  Brazilian  economy  worsened  and  external
pressures  mounted,  the  government  began  to  phase  out  its  myriad  fiscal
incentives  in  the  19809.7  The  citrus  sector  lost  access  to  these  ince.tives
just  as  the  macroeconomic  environment  grew  more  unstable.  In  the  second  half
of  the  1980s,  the  currency  became  increasingly  overvalued  and,  in  the  context
of  failed  stabilization  attempts,  high  real  interest  rates  at  times
substantially  increased  financial  costs  during  this  period.
Sectoral  pollcles
Over  the  last  two  decades,  the  government  has  introduced  several  sector-
specific  policies  that  have  affected  the  citrus  industry. 8 In  1974,  export
licenses  --  issued  by the  Brazilian  Foreign  Trade  Bureau  --  were introduced  as
a  way  of  imposing  a  new  minimum  export  price  scheme.  The  minimum  export  price
scheme  was  expected  to  increase  the  country's  foreign  exchange  revenues  and  to
prevent  capital  flight  by  placing  a t.aoor  on  the  amount  of  foreign  currency
that  Brazilian  exporters  had  to  repatriate  (table  6.3).  The  government  also
took  several  other  steps  during  this  period  in  response  to  the  first  major
economic  crisis  faced  by  the  frozen  concentrate  industry  (described  above).
The  expropriation  of  the  assets  of  the  bankrupt  Sanderson  by  the  state
- 8-govei-nment  of  Sao  Paulo  in  1975  paved  the  way  for  the  appearance  of  a  major
frozen  concentrate  produ-er  (Fruteep)  controlled  by  orange  growers.  Also  in
1975,  the  Foreign  Trade  Bureau  created  a  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice
export  committee,  with  the  power  to  define  the  minimum  export  price  and  export
quotas  at  the  iirm  level  and  to  oversee  fruit  price  ntegotiations  between
growers  and  processors.
Despite  incres3ing  government  intervention,  relations  between  citrus
growers  and  processors  remained  tense.  In  1976,  orange  producers  L.-cueed
Citrosuco  and  Cutrale  of  cartel-like  behavior.9  But  by  1977,  the  Brazilian
frozen  concentrate  industry  entered  a  new  phase  of  expansion  following  a
severe  freeze  in  Florida  citrus  groves.  Price  regulations  became  nonbinding  as
a  sellers'  market  developed  and  international  prices  for  irozen  concentrated
orange  Juice  doubled  between  1976  and  1978  (table  6.3).
Another  chapter  in  the  regulatory  history  of  the  industry  was  opened  in
1979,  as  the  government  introduced  major  changes  in  its  trade  and  exchange
rate  policies.  To  accompany  the  gradual  dismantling  of  existing  export
subsidies,  the  government  agreed  to  a 30  percent  maxidevaluation  of  the
cruzeiro  in  December  1979  --  the  first  major  departure  from  the
ninidevaluation  or  crawling-peg  policy  followed  since  1968.  But  the  government
was  unwilling  to  allow  exporters  to  appropriate  the  difference  between  the  30
percent  increase  in  cruzeiro  revenues  brought  by  the  devaluation  and  the  loss
of  tax  credits  (rebates  of  federal  value  added  taxes)  equivalent  to  15  percent
of  the  export  value.  The  government  introduced  a 30  percent  export  tax  on  the
prevailing  minimum  export  price  of  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice.  The
rationale  was  that  this  tax  would  eliminate  above-normal  profits  ard  help
prevent  terms  of  trade  losses.
The  industry  reacted  strongly  to  these  measures,  which  would  have
redu-ed  the  cruzeiro  earnings  per  metric  ton  of  frozen  concentrate  exporttd  by
0.6  percent  (Duran  and  associates  1981,  32).  The  government  retreated  in
Januery  1980  by  lowering  the  export  tax  rate  to  8  percent.  But  in  May,  it
raisel  the  minimum  export  price  from  $350  a  metric  ton  of  frozen  concentrate
-9-(65  degrees  Brix)  to $900,  thereby  increasing  the  tax  burden  from $28  a ton  to
$72.10
In Jun  1980,  the  rules  of the  game  were changed  again,  as the
government  substituted  a system  of compulsory  contributions  for  the  export
tax.  The  contributions  followed  a  decreasing  schedules  starting  at $210  a ton
on June 1, 1980  they  fell  by $15  every  two  weeks,  reaching  zero  by the  end  of
December.  The  contribution  vas then  to  be returned  to exporters  according  to a
symmetrical  schedule.  The  governmental  objective  --  besides  a short-run
increase  in  revenue  and  access  to zero-cost  financing  --  was to induce
exporte-s  to postpone  sales  to counter&ct  the  declining  trend  in international
prices.
In  May 1980,  the  government  suspended  export  licenses  for  the frozen
concentrate  industry  in order  to force  orange  producers  and  processors  to
reach  an agreement  on conditions  for  the  sale  of the 1980/81  orange  crop.  The
agreement  reached  in  June 1980  established  minimum  prices  for  the  fruit  and
conditions  of payment,  and  for  the  first  time  included  a clause  linking  the
final  price  per box  of oranges  to  market  conditions  for  frozen  concentrate.
The  government  wanted  the industry  to  build  up stabilizing  inventories  of up
to 200,000  metric  tons of frozce  concentrate  --  about  50 percent  of the
Industry's  processing  capacity  at the  time  --  by the  end  of the 1980181
season.  Credit  subsidies  to sustain  this  buildup  of inventories  were offered
as an incentive.  If  market  conditions  improved  and  the  industry  missed  the
carryover  target,  orange  producers  would receive  an additional  $0.015  per  box
delivered  for  each 10,000  metric  tons  of frozen  concentrate  below  the
established  target."
By November  1980,  however,  it became  clear  that this  strategy  would  not
prevent  the international  price  of frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  from
falling.  Florida  had  a  good orange  crop  in 2979/80,  and the  international
market  was already  signaling  a  price  30 to 40 percent  below  the  prevailing
Brazilian  minimum  export  price (table  6.3).  The  government  abolished  the
minimum  export  price  system,  which  meant  that  orange  growers  and  processors
- 10  -had  to  negotiate  a  new  agreement  since  the  minimum  price  per  box  was  linked  to
the  minimum  export  price.  Under  goverwnent  prodding,  growers  agreed  to  drop
the  clause  linking  the  final  price  to inventory  levels  in exchange  for
maintaining  the  minimum  price  per  box  initially  agreed.
Once  more,  however,  an  external  shock  favorably  altered  market
conditions  for  the  Brazilian  frozen  concentrate  Industry.  In  January  1981,  a
freeze  reduced  the  Florida  orange  crop  by  an  estimated  34.3  million  boxes.  The
price  of  frozen  concentrate  bounced  back  promptly,  breaking  the  $1,OlO  a ton
barrier.  Subsequent  freezes  in  Florida  in  1982  and  1983  maintained  sellers'
market  conditions  until  1985.
And  once  more,  the  government  modified  its  sectoral  policies  in  response
to  these  new  circumstances.  It  reintroduced  the  minimum  export  price  and
adopted  a  system  of  export  quotas  in  1982.  The  quotas,  which  were  allocated  to
frozen  concentrate  producers  on  the  basis  of  past  export  performance,  imposed
a  iw  barrier  to  entry  and  strengthened  the  dominant  position  of  the  two
largest  firms  (Cutrale  and  Citrosuco).  The  export  tax  also  reappeared.
By  1985,  however,  the  rapid  expansion  of  Brazilian  production  (table
6.1)  end  optimistic  forecasts  of  the  recovery  of  Florida  orangeries  began  to
drive  international  prices  down  (by  43  percent  in  nominal  terms  between
January  1985  and  February  1986).  The  Brazilian  Foreign  Trade  Bureau  reduced
the  minimum  export  price  several  times,  but  it  could  not  do  so  fast  enough  to
keep  pace  with  changes  in  international  prices.  As  in  1980,  processors  had  to
register  their  sales  at  the  minimum  export  price  value  in  order  to  get  export
licenses  while  effectively  selling  the  product  at  a  lower  price.  Processors
used  their  external  assets  to  reduce  their  sales  price,  returning  the
difference  between  the  minimum  export  price  and  the  market  price  to  buyers  --
a  practice  known  as  camblo-portugues.  Finally,  in  March  1986,  both  the  minimum
export  price  and  export  quotas  were  abolished,  leaving  export  licensing  as  the
sole  instrument  of  government  control.
In  a  parallel  development,  government  attempts  to  mediate  price
negotiations  between  growers  and  processors  failed  in  1985.  Efforts  to  fix  a
- 11  -minimum  price  per  box  of  orange  while  prices  for  frozen  concentrate  were
collapsing  met  strong  resistance  from  processors.  The  government  finally  bowed
out  as  an  arbiter  in  these  negotiations,  and  in  1987  both  sides  accepted  a
market-oriented  solution.  Under  a  new  type  of  pricing  contract,  called  a
participation  contract,  both  sides  agreed  to  base  the  price  for  a  box  of
oranges  on  the  seasonal  average  dollar  price  of  frozen  concentrate  in  the  New
York  futures  market  instead  of  establishing  a  minimum  price  in  domestic
currency.  By  accepting  a  formula  for  sharing  the  risks  of  price  fluctuations,
growers  and  processors  hoped  to  minimize  frictions  in  their  negotiations.
Market  structure,  industrial  organization,  and  competitiveness
The  domestic  market
Unlike  most  of  Brazilian  industry,  the  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice
industry  did  not  rely  on  a  protected  home  market  to  expand  its  capacity.  Since
its  early  stages  in  the  1960s,  the  industry  has  been  outward-oriented,  with
domestic  sales  representing  only  3  to  5  percent  of  total  shipments.  This
market  orientation  contrasts  markedly  with  the  inward-orientation  of  most  of
Brazil's  industries.  Even  after  two  decades  of  export  expansion,  exports  of
other  industries  represented  no  more  than  22.6  percent  of  total  industrial
shipments  in  1989,  compared  with  95  percent  for  the  frozen  concentrate
industry.
Domestic  sales  of  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  have  been  small  for
several  reasons.  First,  per  capita  income  is  relatively  low  (about  $2,000  a
year  in  1989),  and  frozen  concentrate  remains  a  luxury  good  for  most
Brazilians.  Second,  the  domestic  supply  of  fresh  fruit  is  scattered  across  the
country,  enabling  local  fruit  growers  to  compete  successfully  with  the
relatively  high-  priced  frozen  concentrate.  Because  of  this  small  domestic
demand,  monopolistic  pricing  in  the  home  market  has  not  helped  to  pave  the  way
for  export  expansion,  as  it  has  in  some  other  industries.  The  Brazilian  frozen
- 12  -concentrate  industry  has,  however,  achieved  a significant  degree  of market
power  in the  international  scene.
The  International  market
The state  of Sao  Paulo  in  Brazil  and  the state  of Florida  in the  United
States,  the  two  major  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  producing  areas  in the
world,  account  for  about  84 percent  of  world  production.  There  are  also  two
major importing  areas,  the  United  States  and  the  European  Community  (EC),
which  account  for  91 percent  of  world imports.  Australia,  Mexico,  Spain,
Japan,  Israel,  Argentina,  Italy,  Cyprus,  South  Africa,  Cuba,  and  Belize  also
produce  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice,  while  on the  demand  side,  Canada  and
Japan  are also  important  importers.
By the  early  19709,  Brazil  had established  itself  as the leading
exporter  of frozen  concentrated  orange  juice (table  6.6),  but is  was still  a
small  producer  compared  with the  United  States:  Sao  Paulo's  production
represented  only 13  percent  of Florida's  production.  Florida  producers
maintained  price  leadership  in the  world  market  and  were the  primary  suppliers
for  the  U.S.  market.  Brazilian  frozen  concentrate  was exported  mainly  to
Western  Europe,  which  was the fastest  growing  market  for  frozen  concentrated
orange  juice  (Ferreira  and  Larson  1973)  and  was  much less  protected  than the
U.S.  market.  By 1970,  72 percent  of Brazilian  exports  of frozen  concentrated
orange  juice  were going  to the  EC and  only 3  percent  to the  United  States.
Brazilian  exports  to the  U.S.  market  before  the  late  1970s  were
determined  to a large  extent  by technical  considerations.  Brazilian
concentrate  was used to improve  the  color  of early-season  Florida  juice  (Ward
and  Kilmer  1980,  30).12  As long  as the  price  differential  between  Florida  and
Brazilian  concentrates  remained  smaller  than  the  price  wedge  created  by U.S.
trade  barriers,  imports  from  Brazil  were used  mainly  for  reexport.  Drawback
regulations  allowed  U.S.  producers  to receive  rebates  of duty  payments  on
imports  of frozen  concentrate  that  were reexported.  By using  the  drawback
scheme,  U.S. producers  were able  to lower  the  average  price  of U.S.  exports
- 13  -and so  to compete  in third  markets  --  basically,  Europe  --  against  lower  cost
producers.
From 1965  to 1976,  the  United  States  remained  a net  exporter  of frozen
concentrated  orange  juice,  with drawback  operations  accounting  for
approximately  60 percent  of exports  (Moretti  and  associateG  1985,  45).  The
1977 freeze  in Florida  was the  turning  point  in the  modern  history  of the
industry.  Since  then,  the  United  States  has  been  a net importer  of frozen
concentrated  orange  juice.  And since  1978,  the  price  differential  between  the
Florida  and Brazilian  concentrates  has been  larger  than the  tariff  wedge (Ward
and  Kilmer  1989,  135-'7),  and the  Brazilian  product  began  to displace  U.S.
production  and,  indireclly,  Florida-grown  oranges.
The importance  of the  U.S.  market  for  Brazilian  frozen  concentrate
producers  increased  dramatically  with the  consecutive  climate  shocks  suffered
by Florida  citrus  groves  in January  1981,  January  1982,  and  December  1983
(tables  6.1  and 6.4).  Orange  production  in  Florida,  which  had  peaked  at 212.7
million  boxes  during  the 1979/80  season,  fell  to 107.2  million  boxes  by
1984/85,  and  the  production  of frozen  concentrate  from  Florida  oranges  fell
from  670,000  tons to 340,000  tons (FAO  1989b,  41).  And although  citrus
production  in Florida  has since  recovered,  estimates  suggest  that  even  under
optimistic  assumptions,  Florida  will not  surpass  its  previous  output  record
until  the  mid-1990s  (Behr,  Brown,  and  McClain  1989).
Brazilian  dominance  in the  international  market  is  clear.  By the  mid-
1980s,  Brazil  accountad  for  about  80  percent  of  world  exports  of frozen
concentrated  orange  juice  (FAO  1989b,  15).  Brazilian  frozen  concentrate
producers  supplied  more than  94 percent  of U.S. imports  during  the 1980s  and
accounted  for  50 percent  of sales  in  the  U.S.  market.  In the  EC,  Brazil  also
remains  the  primary  supplier,  accounting  for  more than  65 percent  of imports
from  outside  the  EC.
- 14 -Industrlal  organrIzeton
The  contemporary  structure  of  the  Brazilian  frozen  concentrated  orange
juice  industry  began  to  take  shape  in  the  mid-1970.  during  the  industry's
first  major  economic  crisis,  as  several  small  firms  dropped  ou.  or  were
absorbed  by  larger  producers.  After  the  mergers,  the  structure  of  the  industry
became  increasingly  more  concentrated.  By  1985,  Cutrale  and  Citrosuco
controlled  about  65  percent  of  installed  processing  capacity,  up  from  52
percent  in  1975  (Martinelli  1989),  and  jointly  operated  three  small  companies
(Sucorrico,  Tropisuco,  and  Citral).  Four  firms  accounted  for  92  percent  of
Brazil's  exports  of frozen  concentrate  and  90 percent  of installed  processing
capacity  (table  6.7).  The  state  of  Sao  Paulo  was  home  to  twenty-one  of
Brazil's  twenty-eight  processing  plants,  and  Sao  Paulo  producers  controlled  96
percent  of  the  industry's  processing  capacity. 13
Several  important  entry  barriers  help  explain  how  the  industrial
structure  was  able  to  remain  so  concentrated  over  the  last  decade  despite  the
rising  profitability  of  the  industry.  The  existence  of  economies  of  scale  is
one  factor.  Citrosuco,  for  instance,  controls  the  largest  concentrate
processing  plant  in  the  world  (in  Matao,  Sao  Paulo),  with  a  processing
capacity  of  69  million  boxes  of  oranges  a  year.  The  capital  intensity  of  the
industry  has  also  been  increasing,  as  large-scale  producers  move  into  bulk
transport.  Bulk  transport  represents  a  $80-$100  reduction  in  shipping  costs
per  ton  of  frozen  concentrate  over  conventional  shipping  in  200  kilogram
drums,  but  it  requires  heavy  investments  in  tank  farms,  specialized  shipping
terminals,  and  transportation  systems.  Orange  supplies  present  yet  another
obstacle  to  new  firms.  Some  of  the  larger  companies  have  introduced  vertical
integration  to  guarantee  their  orange  supplies.  Accordingly,  they  have
acquired  a  stronger  bargaining  position  with  independent  orange  suppliers  than
new  entrants  would  have.
The  difficulty  of  access  to  established  distribution  networks  in
importing  countries  is  another  major  obstacle  for  new  entrants.  Strong  ties
link  Brazilian  exporters  and  foreign  buyers.  In  the  United  States,  Coca-Cola
- 15  -buys  exclusively  from  Cutrale,  Procter  &  Gamble  from  Cargill,  and  Tropicana,
Pasco,  and  Beatrice  from  Citrosucol  In  Japan,  Mitsui  buys  exclusively  from
Citrosuco.  An estimated  80 percent  of Brazilian  shipments  of frozen
concentrated  orange  juice  to the  United  States  go to those  preferred
importere,  leaving  only 20  percent  of the  market  for  open competition  among
exporters.  This exporter-importer  relationship,  which  usually  involves
significant  price  rebates,  establishes  a dependable  source  of frozen  orange
juice  concentrate  for  beverage  processors  and  a stable  outlet  for the
Brazilian  producer.  In Europe,  preferential  long-run  contracts  between
Brazilian  exporters  and  local  processors  cover  a  much smaller  share  of
transactions.
Finally,  government  policies  up to the  mid-1980.  also supported
concentration  in the  sector.  Export  quotas  based  on past  export  performance  is
probably  the  clearest  example.  The  concentrated  structure  of the industry,  the
barriers  to entry,  and  Brazil's  dominance  in  the international  market  all  made
oligopolistic  pricing  possible.  And price  coordination  has  been often  fostered
by the  Brazilian  government,  through  such  measures  as the  minimum  export  price
system.
internatlonal  competitlveness
For  the  most  part,  the  history  of  the  Brazilian  frozen  concentrated
orange  juice  industry  has  been a tale  of classic  comparative  advantage.
Favorable  climate  and  elaesic  land  and  labor  supplies  for  orange  production
allowed  for  rapid,  low-cost  expansion  of the  industry.  Orange  production  grew
at an average  annual  rate  of 12.5  percent  during  1970-87  (without  any
significant  increase  in  yield  per  tree),  while industrial  processing  capacity
grew  at an annual  rate of 19.2  percent  (tables  6.2  and 6.8).
The  price  of oranges  --  a measure  of comparative  advantage  in the  frozen
concentrated  orange  juice  industry  since  oranges  represent  about  60 percent  of
production  costs  --  is  much lower  in  Sao  Paulo  than  in Florida.  Except  during
the 1985/86  season,  the  on-tree  price  in Florida  has  been at least  twice  the
- 16 -price  in  Brazil  (table  6.9).  Brazil's  cost  advantage  essentially  reflects  its
lower  land  and labor  costs.  Brazil's  international  competitiveness  in the
frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  industry  is also  illustrated  by its  high
index  of revealed  comparative  advantage  of 20.27  in 1985,  which is by far  the
highest  among  the  major industrial  exporting  sectors  in Brazil  (food,
beverages,  and  tobacco  is  next at 3.1).14
Unfair  trade  cases
Protectionism  and  the  U.S.  citrus  Industry
The  dynamism  of Brazilian  exports  and  the  rapid  expansion  of
international  flows  of frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  over the  last  two
decades  were not entirely  unimpeded  by restrictions  on trade  in citrus  juices.
Although  trade  barriers  tend  to be low  or even  absent  in  nonproducing
countries,  they are  quite  high in  most producing  countries  (table  6.10).
Import  duties  have been  the  main instrument  of trade  protection  in
developed  market  economies.  Ad valorem  tariffs  above  20 percent  are  not
unusual,  in sharp  contrast  with low  average  tariff  rates  in these  countries.
Some  countries  apply  specific  duties,  with implied  tariff  rates  as high  as 40
percent,  depending  on  market  conditions.  In  Japan,  high  tariffs  were augmented
by an import  quota  system  for  oranges  and concentrate  that  is now  being  phased
out  under  a bilateral  agreement  with the  United  States  (PAO,  1989b).
The  history  of  protection  for  the  citrus  juice  industry  in the  United
States  is probably  the  clearest  example  of the industry's  ability  to secure
protection  against  foreign  suppliers.  The Smoot-Hawley  Tariff  Act of 1930
introduced  a  duty  of 70 cents  a gallon  on the  regular-strength  equivalent  of
frozen  concentrated  orange  juice." 5 In 1948,  the  most-favored-nation  rate  was
reduced  to 35 cents  a gallon  (equivalent  to $487  per ton  of concentrate  at 65
degrees  Brix),  where it  remains." Drawback  regulations  allow  refunds  of 99
percent  of the duty if  an equivalent  quantity  of frozen  concentrate  is
- 17  -exported  within  three  years.  The importance  of drawbacks  declined  after  1977,
however,  as the  U.S. industry  became  more and  more inward-oriented.
In addition  to the import  duty,  all froze.s  concentrated  orange  juice
imports  arriving  in the  United  States  through  a Florida  port  must  pay the
Florida  citrus  import  equalization  excise  tax  of $41.50  a  metric  ton.  The  tax
was introduced  under  pressure  from  the  Florida  Citrus  Commission  as a  way of
making  imports  share  in advertising  and  promotion  costs  paid  by Florida
producers.  The importance  of this  tax  has  been declining,  however,  because  a
growing  proportion  of imports  are  arriving  through  ports  outside  Florida.  In
the  late 1970s,  83 percent  of imports  arrived  through  Florida  ports,  but  by
1986  this share  had  dropped  to 46  percent,  largely  because  of the  growth  of
tank  farms (which  process  bulk juices)  outside  of Florida  (Ward  and  Kilmer
1989,  134).  Such  processing  and  packaging  operations  have  become  economically
feasible  because  of the  growing  shift  in  U.S. consumer  demand  from  frozen
concentrate  to chilled,  reconstituted  orange  juice.  And, as Berman  (1986,  50)
points  out,  this  structural  shift  is bound  to continue  as  long  as Brazilian
producers  have a strong  interest  in finding  ways to bypass  the  equalization
tax.
In the early  1980s,  Florida  growers,  beset  by increasing  import
competition  and a consecutive  series  of climate  shocks,  began  to look  for
alternative  forms  of protection.  That  they  turned  to  unfair  trade  laws is  not
surprising  since  the  United  States,  as  well as other  developed  countries,  has
been  relying  increasingly  on these  laws  as a substitute  for  safeguard  actions.
And considering  Brazil's  interventionist  trade  policies,  the  prevailing  belief
in the  United  States  was that  any  Brazilian  industry  was "guilty"  of unfair
trade  practices  until  proven  innocent."'  That  meant  that  the  task of  building
political  support  for  relief  against  Brazilian  exports  did  not require  a  major
public-relations  effort  from  import-competing  industries  in the  United  States.
- 18  -The  U.S.  countervaillqg  duty  Invest4gatton
On July 14, 1982,  Florida  Citrus  Mutual,  an association  of orange
growers,  filed  a  petition  claiming  that  the  Brazilian  government  was
subsidizing  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  eAports.e'  The  U.S.  Commerce
Department  accepted  the  petition  and  initiated  an  investigation  under  U.S.
countervailing  duty  laws.  On  September  9,  the  U.S.  International  Trade
Commission  (ITC)  issued  an  affirmative  preliminary  determination  of  injury  to
domestic  producers,  and  on  December  13,  the  Commerce  Department  issued  a
preliminary  determination  that  the  Brazilian  government  was  subsidizing  local
producers.19
Two  Brazilian  programs  were  explicitly  identified  as  providing  subsidy-
like  benefits:  Resolution  674,  which  provided  preferential  financing  of
working  capital  for  exporters,  and  the  income  tax  exemption  for  export
earnings.  Based  on  data  provided  by  the  three  leading  Brazilian  frozen
concentrate  exporters  (Cutrale,  Citrosuco,  and  Cargill),  the  Commerce
Department  estimated  that  preferential  financing  under  Resolution  674  was
equivalent  to  a subsidy  of  1.64  percent 20 and  the  income  tax  exemption  to  a
subsidy  of  1.13  percent  of  the  value  of  the  Brazilian  exports.  On  December  17,
1982,  the  Commerce  Department  ordered  a  suspension  of  liquidation  of  all
Brazilian  exports  of  frozen  concentrate  to  the  United  States,  and  an  import
deposit  of  2.655  percent  of  the  fob  value  of  Brazilian  frozen  concentrated
orange  juice  sales  was  imposed.
The  Brazilian  government  responded  in  January  1983  by  requesting  that
the  investigation  be  susperded  and  offering  to  impose  an  export  tax  equal  to
the  estimated  subsidy. 2 1 While  the  agreement  was  being  negotiated,  the
subsidy  linked  to  Resolution  674  was  reassessed  at  2.38  percent,  because  of
new  developments  in  the  Brazilian  financial  market.  Finally,  a  suspension
agreement  was  signed  on  February  24,  1983,  and  on  April  30,  1983,  Brazil
imposed  an  export  tax  of  3.51  percent  on  its  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice
exports  to  the  United  States.
- 19  -Despite  the  suspension  agreement,  the  Brazilian  government  requested
that  the  subsidy  investigation  be  concluded.  On  June  6,  1983,  the  Commerce
Department  issued  a  positive  final  determination,  and  on  July  14,  the  ITC
issued  its  final  injury  determination,  ruling  that  the  local  industry  was
threatened  with  material  injury  because  of  Brazilian  subsidies. 22 The  ITC
ruling  argued  that  the  recovery  of  the  U.S.  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice
industry  to  prefreeze  production  and  profitability  levels,  given  flat
consumption  trends,  would  be  hindered  by  future  subsidized  imports.  The
suspension  agreement,  based  on  the  offsetting  Brazilian  export  tax,  was
maintained.
On  May  31,  1984,  Cutrale,  Citrosuco,  and  Cargill  filed  a  request  for  a
review  of  the  injury  ruling,  arguing  that  the  December  1983  freeze  in  Florida
and  the  lower-than-expected  Brazilian  crop  of  1983/84  had  changed  the
circumstances  under  which  the  industry  operated.  Florida  Citrus  Mutual  opposed
the  request,  but  the  ITC  agreed  to  initiate  an  investigation.  On  December  11,
1984,  the  ITC  ruled  that  revocation  of  the  suspension  agreement  would  threaten
the  domestic  industry  with  material  injury.
This  first  experience  of  Brazilian  frozen  concentrate  producers  with
accusations  of  unfair  trade  practices  was  significantly  influenced  by  events
beyond  the  control  of  the  Brazilian  industry.  The  increased  demand  for
protection  from  Florida  producers  arose  mainly  from  the  cost-push  price  impact
of  unusual  back-to-back  climate  shocks.  The  second  round  of  unfair  trade
actions  against  the  Brazilian  frozen  concentrate  industry,  however,  was  more
directly  related  to  reactions  of  Brazilian  firms  to  market  developments.
Antldumping  cases23
By  the  mid-1980s,  the  Brazilian  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice
industry  found  itself  in  a  trap.  The  unusual  sequence  of  severe  freezes  in
Florida  and  the  high  world  prices  that  prevailed  throughout  the  first  half  of
the  decade  had  fostered  a  dramatic  expansion  of  Brazil's  orange  production  and
processing  capacity.  The  Brazilian  harvest  of  1985/86  produced  a  record  239
- 20 -million  boxes  of oranges.  At the same  time,  the  Florida  orange  industry  was
showing  the  first  signs  of  recovery,  with a 14  percent  increase  in outpuc  over
the  previous  record-low  season.
Brazilian  processors  were  also  facing  an unusual  situation.  The
expansion  in processing  capacity  had  increased  the  competition  for  future
orange  supplies.  By late  1984,  while  the international  demand  for  Brazilian
concentrate  was still  strong,  Brazilian  processors  tried  to guarantee  their
future  orange  supplies  by offering  significant  advance  payments  for  the
1985/86  crop.  This  competition  bid  prices  up to a record  level  (table  6.9).
Meanwhile,  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  prices  in the  U.S.  market,
which  had  been fairly  stable  after  a steep  increase  in  the first  part of 1984,
began  to show  a clear  downward  trend  after  May 1985.  This trend  reflected  the
excess  supply  conditions  that  had  developed  in the  international  market.  But
it caught  Brazilian  producers  in a vulnerable  position,  locked  into  high-price
contracts  for  their  main input  while facing  declining  world  prices  for  their
product.
The  financial  squeeze  suffered  by Brazilian  producers  during  the 1985/86
season  was severe. 2' While  the  average  minimum  export  price  for  the season
was about  $1,100  a  metric  ton (at  65 degrees  Brix),  direct  production  costs
averaged  $1,327.50  a  ton:  fruit  costs  ($935  for  250  boxes)  plus  pick and  haul
costs ($112.50)  plus  processing,  warehousingt  and  transport  costs  to the  port
of Santos  ($280.00).  Other  costs  to  producers  included  the  state  value  added
tax  of 8.5  percent  (on  the fob  export  value),  the  export  tax  of 1  percent,  and
the  offsetting  export  tax  of 3.51  percent  on all  shipments  to the  United
States.
The  picture  becomes  even  bleaker  when one  considers  that  the  minimum
export  price  was really  just  an accounting  artifact  and  not a  relevant  price
benchmark  for frozen  concentrate  exporters.  As international  prices  collapsed,
the  minimum  export  price  often  lagged  behind,  forcing  Brazilian  producers  to
practice  the  cambio-portugues  described  earlier.  The  effective  price  received
by Brazilian  exporters  in 1985/86  was only  about  $850  to $900  a ton (USDA
- 21 -1986),  or approximately  20  percent  below  the  average  official  minimum  export
price  for  the  period.
Reflecting  these  market  developments,  Brazilian  frozen  concentrate
exports  fell  by almost  12  percent  between  the  1984/85  and 1985/86  seasons.  At
the same  time,  production  reached  record  levels  in 1985/86  (875,000  tons  at 65
degrees  Brix).  With exports  down  and  the  domestic  market  continuing  to be only
a  marginal  source  of demand  (less  than  5 percent  of total  demand),  the
industry  ended  the  season  with  very  high stocks  of frozen  concentrate  (about
230,000  metric  tons),  further  contributing  to its  financial  woes."3
This imbalance  between  production  costs  and  sales  prices  was the  result
mainly  of an exceptional  lack  of coordination  among  Brazilian  firms  as they
fought  to secure  stable  input  supplies.  Yet, it  was promptly  seized  on by
foreign  producers  as a situatior  that  could  be exrloited  under  the  unfair
trade  banner.  In 1986,  the  Brazilian  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  industry
was accused  of dumping  by both  the  United  States  and  Australia.
The  U.S. antidumping  case.  On May  9, 1986,  Florida  Citrus  Mutual  filed  a
petition  arguing  that  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  from  Brazil  was being
sold in the  United  States  at "less  than  fair  value,"  and the  Commerce
Department  agreed  to initiate  an antidumping  duty investigation.  On June  23,
the ITC  issued  a preliminary  determination  that  the  U.S. frozen  concentrated
orange  juice  industry  was "materially  injured  or threatened  with material
injury"  by imports  of frozen  concentrate  from  Brazil  at less  than fair  value
(USITC  1986,  1).
On October  16,  1986,  the  Commerce  Department  issued  a preliminary
determination  that  Brazilian  sales  of frozen  concentrate  in  the  United  States
were being  made at lees  than fair  value  and  estimated  the  dumping  margin  at
8.45  percent.  In its  final  determination  on March  17,  1987,  the  Commerce
Department  maintained  the  suspension  of liquidation  of all  exports  of frozen
concentrated  orange  juice  from  Brazil,  except  those  from  Cutrale,  imposing  an
import  deposit  of 1.96  percent  of the  selling  price. 26 The  estimated  margin
for  Cutrale's  sales  was negligible  (0.48  percent),  and its  exports  to the
- 22 -United  States  (35  to  40  percent  of  total  Brazilian  exports  to  the  United
States)  were  excluded  from  the  suspension  of  liquidation  order.  In  Arril  1987,
the  ITC  made  a  positive  final  determination  of  injury.
This  antidumping  case  raised  many  complex  legal  issues.  Several  U.S.
companies  --  including  the  National  Juice  Products  Association,  Procter  &
Gamble,  Tropicana,  and  Coca-Cola  --  opposed  the  investigation.  They  argued,
along  with  the  Brazilian  respondents,  that  Florida  Citrus  Mutual  was  not  an
interested  party  since  its  members  (basically,  orange  grovers)  did  not  produce
the  like-product  (frozen  concentrated  orange  juice).  They  also  argued  that
Florida  Citrus  Mutual  had  not  established  from  the  beginning  that  a  majority
of  the  industry  supported  the  investigation  and,  furthermore,  that  it  could
not  have  done  so  because  a  majority  of  the  U.S.  industry  opposed  the
investigation.
Despite  this  opposition,  the  Commerce  Department  found  that  there  were
sufficient  grounds  to  initiate  the  investigation.  On  the  issue  of  whether  the
petitioner  was  an  interested  party,  the  Department  pointed  out  that  although
Florida  Citrus  Mutual  had  been  the  only  petitioner  in  the  earlier
countervailing  duty  investigation,  the  issue  of  standing  had  not  been  raised
at  that  opportunity.  Besides,  after  the  investigation  had  baen  initiated,  the
petition  was  amended  to  add  six  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  processors  as
copetitioners.
The  question  of  majority  support  was  dealt  with  in  two  stages.  First,
the  Commerce  Department  argued  that  initiation  of  unfair  trade  procedures  does
not  require  majority  support  in  the  domestic  industry.  Comerce's
interpretation  was  tantamount  to  saying  that  a  petitioner  is  presumed  to  be
filing  on  behalf  of  the  domestic  industry  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  a
majority  of  the  domestic  industry  opposes  the  petition.  Second,  although
recognizing  that  the  parties  opposing  the  investigation  represented  a
significant  proportion  of  the  U.S.  industry  (they  accounted  for  52.9  percent
of  U.S.  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  production),  the  Commerce  Department
argued  that  the  proper  definition  of  the  industry  should  exclude  processors
- 23  -whose Brazilian  imports  accounted  for  more than  50 percent  of production.  Once
this "exclusion  provision"  was applied,  the  remaining  firms  opposing  the
investigation  accounted  for  only  38.64  percent  of U.S. production  and,
accordingly,  did  not represent  a  majority  of the industry.
In 1988,  the  question  of  majority  support  was brought  up again  by
Citrosuco  in a petition  to the  U.S.  Court  of International  Trade."  The
argument  was again  rebuffed,  with the  court  stating  that the  Commerce
Department  had the  discretion  to reject  a petition  for  lack  of industry
support  but  was not "required  to dismiss  petitions  that are  not proven  to  be
affirmatively  supported  by the  domestic  industry." 26
Finger  and  Murray  (1990)  have  pointed  out  that  unfair  trade  procedures
in the  United  States,  once initiated,  have a  high  probability  of culminating
in an affirmative  determination.  The  broad  interpretation  of injury  is a  major
factor  behind  this  bias in favor  of the  petitioner.  In the  case  of the  frozen
concentrated  orange  juice  investigation,  the final  dumping  margin  was quite
small  and  the  penetration  ratio  for  Brazilian  frozen  concentrate  in the  U.S.
market  had  changed  little  in 1985/86  from  the  previous  season. 9 Yet, the  ITC
reached  a positive  injury  determination  by a  vote of 3 to 2.  LA short,  the
history  of this  antidumping  investigation  highlights  the flexibility  of U.S.
legislation  in accommodating  the  protectionist  interests  of domestic  producers
under  competitive  pressure  from  foreign  imports.
The  Australian  antidumping  case.  On July 25,  1986,  the  Australian  Citrus
Processors  Association  submitted  a  complaint  on  behalf  of eight  processors  to
the  Australian  Customs  Service,  claiming  that  Brazilian  frozen  concentrated
orange  juice  was being  exported  to  Australia  at prices  below  "normal  value"  --
that  is,  at prices  that  did  not  recover  the  full  cost  to produce  and  sell  the
frozen  concentrate.  The gist  of the  complaint  was that international  prices
had fallen  from $1,800  to $800  per  metric  ton (65  degrees  Brix)  between
February  1985  and  March 1986,  while  the  normal  value  for  Brazilian  concentrate
was about  $1,401  a ton (fob  Santos).  The  normal-value  estimate  was based  on
cost  of production  data  published  in  a U.S.  periodical  (CItrograph,  June
- 24 -1986),  using  a  methodology  similar  to  that  presented  in  the  cost  estimate
described  above.
The Australian  market  accounted  for  only  0.5  percent  of  Brazilian  export
revenues  in  1985  and  1986  (table  6.3),'°  and  the  share  of  Brazilian  imports
in  orange  juice  consumption  in  Australia  had  been  declining  since  1983  (from
42  percent  in  1983/84  to  27  percent  in  1986/87).  So  although  Brazil  was  the
source  of  90  percent  of  Australian  Imports  throughout  this  period,  the
Australian  market  was  of  only  marginal  importance  to  Brazilian  producers.  This
fact  helps  to  explain  why Brazilian  producers  failed  to  cooperate  in  the
antidumping  investigation.  Of the  five  Brazilian  companies  asked  to  supply
information,  only  Frutropic,  with  3.2  percent  of  the  Brazilian  industry's
processing  capacity,  bothered  to  answer.  Accordingly,  the  Customs  Service
considered  the  information  provided  by  the  petitioners  as  the  best  information
available  for  the  investigation.
In  November 1986,  the  Australian  Customs  Service  made a  preliminary
determination  of  dumping  and  established  a  noninjurious  free  on  board  (NIFOB)
value  of  $1,050  per  metric  ton  for  Brazilian  concentrate  (FA0,  1989b). 3 ' In
the  final  determination  of  June  1987,  Customa  reaffirmed  its  finding  of
dumping  and  ruled  that  a  causal  link  existed  between  this  practice  and  some  of
the  claims  of  material  injury  made  by  the  Australian  industry.  Customs  did  not
consider  that  imposition  of  a  duty  equivalent  to  the  full  dumping  margin  was
warranted,  deciding  instead  on  an  amount  equal  to  the  difference  between  the
fob  export  price  and  the  NIFOB  value.  The  NIFOB  value  was  established  at
$1,401  a  ton  for  iiports  before  December  31,  1986,  and  $1,200  for  those
entering  after  January  1,  1987.
Effects  of  unfair  trade  actions
Effects  on  policy.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  policy  environment  in
which  the  Brazilian  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  industry  operates  has
gone  through  some  major  changes  since  the  first  unfair  trade  accusations  in
the  early  1980s.  The  minimum  export  price  scheme,  export  quotas,  and
- 25  -goverument  Intervention  in  the  negotiations  between  procassors  and  orange
growers  have  all  disappeared,  suggesting  a  move toward  liberalization.  But  the
tax  burden  on  the  sector  has  grown  heavier,  with  the  introduction  of  the  state
value  added  taz  and  the  end  of  the  income  tax  exemption  for  export-related
profits.
But  the  link  between  these  changes  and  the  unfair  trade  cases  is  tenuous
at  best.  The  demise  of  export  subsidies  was  part  of  a  broader  reform  in
response  to  both  external  pressures  and  domestic  interests,  including  the
search  for  new sources  of  revenue  by  state  goverAments.  Macroeconomic
developments  provided  the  impetus  for  most  of  the  recent  changes  in  industry-
specific  policies.  The  only  major  exception  was  the  offsetting  export  tax
introduced  under  the  U.S.-Brazil  suspension  agreement  in  the  countervailing
duty  case.  It  is  ironic  that  while  the  offending  subsidies  have  since  been
discontinued  (or  significantly  reduced),  the  export  tax  has  remained.' 2
Effects  on  the  industry.  Brazilian  producers  have  avoided  International
price  discrimination  since  1986 to  prevent  third-market  sales  prices  from
being  used  as  a  basis  for  new  antidumping  cases.  So  despite  the  strong
devaluation  of  the  U.S.  dollar  vis-a-vis  European  currencies  since  1985,  there
has  basically  been  only  one  "world  price"  for  Brazilian  frozen  concentrated
orange  juice.  3 3
Interviews  conducted  witn  Brazilian  producers  suggest  that  Brazilian
pricing  behavior  in  export  markets  during  the  1980.  has  been  consistent  with  a
dominant-firm  price-leadership  strategy.  Since  Florida  is  the  only  other
significant  world  supplier  of  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice,  Brazilian
producers  have  been  able  to  use  U.S.  supply  forecasts  as  a  basis  for
establishing  prices  that  will  maximize  their  short-run  profits  for  a given
level  of  residual  world  demand.  Errors  are  absorbed  through  stock  movements.
In  short,  during  periods  of  tight  wor'd  supply,  Brazilian  exporters  seem
content  to  consider  their  foreign  sales  as  complementary  to  the  domestic
production  of  importing  countries.
- 26  -Price  coordination  among  Brazilian  firms  has  also  been  facilitatad  by
some  institutional  developments  fostered  by the  1985/86  crisis.  The  most
important  change  was  the  adoption  of  participation  contracts  by  orange  growers
and  processors  for  sharing  the  risks  of  international  price  fluctuations.
These  contracts  diminish  the  danger  of  a  cost-revenue  mismatch  such  as  those
that  occurred  in  1974/75  and  1985/86.  They  also  lessen  the  vulnerability  of
the  industry  to  accusations  of  selling  at  below-cost  prices.  Another  change
was  the  Brazilian  government's  adoption  in  January  1987  of  a  reference-price
system  to  guide  the  repatriation  of  foreign  exchange  earnings.  The  reference
export  price  --  which  is  also  used in  preparing  participation  contracts  --  is
established  by  subtracting  the  costs  of  transport,  the  U.S.  tariff,  the  less-
than-fair-value  margin,  U.S.  warehousing,  port  and  brokerage  fees,  the  Florida
equalization  tax,  and  other  costs  from  the  price  of  frozen  concentrate  in  the
New  York  futures  market.'
Since  the  1985/86  season,  there  has  been  no  excess  supply  in  the
international  market  for  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice.  Dry  weather,
disease,  and  poor  care  of  citrus  groves  reduced  Brazilian  orange  production  to
an  average  of  10  percent  below  its  record  output  of  1985186  (table  6.8).  A
significant  increase  in  domestic  demand  for  freshly  squeezed  orange  juice
during  the  artificial  economic  boom  created  by  the  Cruzado  Plan  (1986)  and
lower  concentrate  ratios  for  the  Brazilian  orange  also  helped  to  reduce  the
output  of  the  Brazilian  frozer  concentrate  industry  (table  6.1).  At  the  same
time,  the  recovery  of  Florida  groves  was  slower  than  expected,  while  consumer
demand  remained  strong  in  both  the  United  States  and  Europe.  Under  these  tight
supply  conditions  --  a  reversal  of  the  scenario  that  motivated  the  antidumping
investigations  --  one  might  even  argue  that  there  are  no  majer  opposing
interests  between  domestic  producers  in  importing  countries  and  Brazilian
exporters.
Most  models,  however,  forecast  that  growth  in the  supply  of  frozen
concentrated  orange  juice  will  outpace  growth  in  demand,  creating  a  buyers'
market  by  the  early  1990s  (FAO, 1989b).  Already  by  late  1990,  expectations  of
- 27  -bumper  orange  crops  in Florida  and  Sao Paulo  caused  a rapid  drop in the
international  price  of frozen  concentrate.  Thus,  market  conditions  that tend
to elicit  charges  of dumping  are  likely  to  emerge  again  in the 19908.
Furthermore,  since  Brazilian  producers  have  higher  fixed  costs (reflecting
their  larger  scale  and larger  stock  accumulation  practices),  they remain
vulnerable  to accusations  of pricing  below  average  cost  during  periods  of
falling  prices."  Whether  the  Brazilian  industry  will be able  to escape  these
accusations,  given  the  new  marketing  and  institutional  arrangements  introduced
in the  mid-1980s,  is an open  question.  Still,  there  is  no doubt  that  Brazilian
companies  are  now  more difficult  targets  for  unfair  trade  actions  than  during
past episodes  of excess  supply.
The  measures  imposed  as a result  of unfair  trade  cases  have  had only  a
marginal  impact  on the industry  and  have been  completely  dominated  by other
distortions  affecting  the industry.  The direct  burden  imposed  on  producers  by
the  offsetting  export  tax  on sales  to the  U.S.  market  was less  than  half  that
of Sao  Paulo's  value-added  tax.  And the  U.S. antidumping  duty  of 1.96  percent
is dwarfed  by the  specific  import  duty  of $487  per  metric  ton,  which  was
equivalent  to a 22  percent  ad  valorem  tariff  on the average  U.S. selling  price
for  the 1987-89  period.  The  Australian  antidumping  duty,  in turn,  has  become
completely  irrelevant  during  1988  and 1989  as the  Brazilian  fob  price  has
risen  above  the  estimated  noninjurious  free  on board  value.
That is  not to say  that  the  unfair  trade  actions  had  no impact  on the
performance  of Brazilian  firms.  Most important,  as described  above,  was the
apparent  education  effect  of the  antidumping  cases,  which  helped  bring  about
institutional  changes  and  new  marketing  arrangements  that  intensified
oligopolistic  coordination  among  frozen  concentrate  producers.  Second,  the
"noise"  created  by the  Australian  antidumping  investigation  was sufficient  to
shut  down that  market  for  Brazilian  firms  during  1987 (table  6.4).  Last  but
not least,  Brazilian  firms  were unanimous  in  pointing  out  the  high  harassment
effect  associated  with these  investigations.
- 28 -Interviews  vith  representatives  of  Brazilian  firma  revealed  not  only
their  distaste  for  external  audits,  but  also  the  substantial  coat.  According
to  some  experts,  legal  fees  associated  with  the  defense  against  antidumping
accusations  have  averaged  more  than  $500,000  per  company.  One  interviewee
suggested  that  the  total  coats  incurred  by  his  company  (including  the
opportunity  cost  of  personnel  assigned  to  gather  the  information  requested  by
antidumping  investigators)  have  been  as  high  as  $3  million  since  1986.
What  have  been  the  welfare  effects  of  the  unfair  trade  cases?  In  an
earlier  study  of  the  U.S.  specific  duty  on  imports  of  frozen  coneentrated
orange  juice,  Hufbauer,  Berliner,  and  Elliot  (1986)  found  that  the  gains  to
exporters  from  trade  restrictions  were  negligible  and  that  most  of  the  welfare
losses  of  $130  million  (in  1983  prices)  were  associated  with  the  efficiency
losses  resulting  from  expanded,  higher-cost  production  in  the  United  States.
This  analysis  was  based  on  a  simple  partial-equilibrium  model  that  assumes
that  the  imported  and  domestic  goods  are  imperfect  substitutes  and  that  the
supply  that  of  imports  is  perfectly  elastic.  The  results  imply  that  the
welfare  effects  on  Brazilian  exporters  of  the  much  lower  duties  resulting  from
unfair  trade  actions  must  have  been  insignificant.
Conclusion
The  Brazilian  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  industry  was  able  to
expand  rapidly  despite  high  levels  of  protection  in  its  major  markets  --
particularly  in  the  United  States  --  and  erratic  changes  in  Brazilian  policies
at  both  macro  and  micro  levels.  This  dynamism is  explained  not  only  by
Brazil's  comparative  advantage  in  production,  but  also  by  the  fortuitous  (from
the  perspective  of  Brazilian  producers)  occurrence  of  consecutive  climate
shocks  to  Florida's  orange  groves.
Despite  the  high  profitability  of  the  industry  over  most  of  the  1980s,
major  entry  barriers  make  it  unlikely  that  any  large  new  firms  will  enter  the
market.  At  the  same  time,  production  of  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  is
- 29 -expected  to  increase  substantially  In  Brazil  and  Florida,  barring  any  adverse
exogenous  shocks.
Unfair  trade  cases  against  Brazilian  firma  had  little  direct  Impact  on
output  or  price  levels.  Apparently,  however,  they  created  incentives  for  the
adoption  of  practices  that  promote  oligopolistic  coordination  among  Brazilian
firms.  The widespread  adoption  of  participation  contracts  between  orange
growers  and  the  industry  and  the  avoidonce  of  price-discrimination  practices
in  the  international  markets  are  good  examples  of  these  effects.  And  to  the
extent  that  these  unfair  trade  cases  fostered  the  market  power  of  Brazilian
frozen  concentrate  producers,  they  increased  the  likelihood  of  additional
long-term  welfare  costs  to  consumers  worldwide.
The  folly  of  these  unfair  trade  actions  is  particularly  evident  from
their  Impact  on  its  supposed  beneficiaries  --  the  U.S.  citrus  industry.  The
antidumping  cases  were  basically  used  to  protect  orange  growers  and  higher-
cost  frozen  concentrate  producers  at  the  expense  of  U.S.  juice  and  soft  drink
proceesors  and  distributors  linked  by  marketing  arrangements  to  Brazilian
concentrate  exporters.  Its  main  effect  has  probably  been  to  strengthen  the
oligopoly-oligopsony  relationship  between  Brazilian  producers  and  their  U.S.
partners,  as  suggested  by  their  joint  defense  strategy  In  the  antidumping
investigation,  further  hindering  the  prospects  for  competition  in  the  world
market  for  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice.
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- 32 -Table 6.1 Frozen concentrated orange juice production In Florida and Sao Paulo, 1961-87
(in thousands of metric tons at 65 degrees Bri)
Year  Florida  Sao Paulo  Year  Florida  Sao Paulo
1961  265.7  - 1975  561.0  189.0
1962  364.8  1976  586.5  211.0
1963  162.6  6.0  1977  497.6  229.0
1964  169.0  5.0  1978  507.6  400.0
1965  279.8  8.0  1979  545.0  424.0
1966  241.8  14.0  1980  728.2  479.0
1967  414.8  22.0  1981  526.5  586.0
1968  263.5  33.0  1982  386.6  550.0
1969  326.7  29.0  1983  491.8  508.0
1970  393.4  48.0  1984  351.6  726.0
1971  394.1  80.0  1985  348.6  848.0
1972  422.6  107.0  1986  384.0  600.0
1973  554.4  121.0  1987  422.0  750.0
1974  541.1  170.0
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture.
- 33  -Table 62 Processing capacity of frZen
concentrated orange juice plants, In the state of
Sao Paulo, selected years, 196S87
(1000 boxes of oranges)








Note A Braziilan  plant  typically  process  285  boms  of oranges  to
produce  1 metric  ton of fromen  concentrated  orange  juice at 65
degrees  Brix
Sources:  U.S.  Department  of Agriculture,  Food  and Agriculture
Servces;  Institute  of Agricultural  Economics,  State  of Sao Paulo.
- 34  -Table  6.3 Brazilian  prices  of frozen concentrated  orange  juice,  1963-89
(U.S. dollars per metric ton at 65 degrees Brix)
Average  price  Minimum erport  prnce
Year  (fob Santos)  Price  Montha
1963  408  na
1964  378  na
1965  327  na
1966  340  na
1967  359  na
1968  386  na
1969  469  na
1970  440  na
1971  464  na
1972  476  na
1973  526  na
1974  546  560  February
1975  454  350
1976  481  350
1977  829  350
1978  963  350
1979  980  350
1980  844  900  May-November
1981  1,031  na
1982  1,100  1,200
1883  1,099  1,100  December





1985  1,545  1,800  January
1,400  June
1,150  November
1986  844  1,000  January
800b  March
1987  1,100  na
1988  1,724  na
1989  1,395  na
na Indicates  that no minimum  esport price was in force.
a. Month new price was intraduced. In 1980, the minimum  eport  price was In effect fronw  May to
November, and the scheme was then discontinued  for a while.
b. Export liense  price, established for calculating amount of resotrces that had to be repatriated.
Source: Brazilian  Foregn  Trade Bureau.
- 35  -Tbke 6.4 Value of exports  (fob) in major markets for Brazilian frozen concentrated orange juice,
selected years, 1975-88
(thousands of U.S. dollars)
European  United  Other
Year  Australia  Cananda  Community  States  markets  Total
1975  na  9,865  45,212  9,042  18,085  82,204
1980  7,282  33,865  181,688  66,787  49,030  338,652
1981  4,447  85,689  299,696  268,439  876  659,147
1982  11,984  22,936  159,996  328,235  50,237  573,388
1983  15,026  36,476  223,898  281,822  50,648  607,930
1984  19,903  70,725  356,494  901,392  65,986  1,414,500
1985  3,625  37,446  217,676  436,602  53,576  748,925
1986  3,360  41,525  259,462  350,308  27,531  628,186
1987  0  66,440  370,730  359,808  33,521  880,499
1988  !0.548  80,103  548,210  459,731  45,740  1,144,332
Source: Brazilian Foreign Trade Bureau and Abrassucos.
- 36  -Table 6.5 Selected macroeconomic indicators for the Bralian  economy, 1970-89
Cufent  Trade  Inflation
waccount  Growth  of  Real  erchange  balance  rateb
Year  (US$  miL  )  real  GDP  rate  iee  (US$  miL)  (%)
1970  -562  - 873  232  19.8
1971  -1,307  11.3  90.4  -341  187
1972  -1,489  11.9  93.4  -244  16.8
1973  -1,688  14.0  84.7  7  16.2
1974  -7,122  8.2  77.1  -4,690  33.8
1975  -6,700  5.2  77.2  -3,540  30.1
1976  -6,062  10.3  74.2  -? 147  48.2
1977  4,038  4.9  73.4  97  38.6
1978  -6,991  5.0  83.4  -1,024  40.5
1979  -10,743  6.8  84.1  -2,840  76.8
1980  -12,807  9.2  94.4  -2,830  110.2
1981  -11,735  -4.4  79.5  1,202  95.2
1982  -16,310  0.7  74.0  780  99.7
1983  -6,837  -3.4  98.7  6,470  211.0
1984  45  5.0  100.0  13,089  233.8
1985  -241  8.3  102.8  12,406  235.1
1986  -5,304  7.5  103.9  8,305  65.0
1987  -1,428  3.6  97.2  11,173  415.8
1988  4,889  0.0  93A  19,184  1,037.6
1989  1,424  3.6  73.1  16,111  1,782.9
a. Real exchange rate in terms of the U.S. dollar, taking the OECD GDP deflator as an index of
world prices and the Brasilian GDP deflator as an index of domestic prices.
b. Yearly growth of general price index-FGV.
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil, World Bank (1989), Conjuntzra Economica, and authors'
calculations.
- 37  -Table  6.6  MJorw  woM eportern of hrewn  conaenatndd  onwn Juko4  aeuked  yem, 197047
(metrc tons  at 65 deges  Bdx)
1970  1974  1978  1983  1987
CM"t  UUMF-W  ama  %  QUMVU--y  %  OnV  %Q 
Brazi  33.47  18.4  10&46  35.9  335.63  65.6  553.11  73.5  754.80  733
United  States  33.29  18.3  50.48  16.7  45.59  8.9  51.46  6.8  40.19  3.9
ksael  18.23  10.0  38.63  12.8  33.92  6.6  94.04  12.5  142.72  13.9
Spain  18.21  10.0  18.20  6.0  1939  3.8  6.02  0.8  958  0.9
Italy  25.70  14.1  16.70  53  9.36  1.8  12.04  1.6  22.57  2.2
Morroco  22.91  12.6  12.39  4.1  10.64  2.1  9.48  1.3  11.03  1.1
Others  30.12  16.5  57.53  19.0  56.68  11.1  26.26  3.5  49.56  4.8
Total  182.09  100.0  302.29  100.0  S115S  100.0  752.33  100.0  1,030.44  100.0
Note:  Figuras  may  not add up to totals because of rounding.
Souree Ilas (1981)  and Butler  (1988).
- 38  -Table 6.7 Market  concentration  ratios in the Brazilian frozen concentrated  orange  juice
industry, 1983-85
(percentage shares)
1984  1985a  1983
E:xpol  E:xport  E-Wort  Export  Processing
Firm  quantit&is  revenue  quantities  revenue  capaciy
Sucocitrico
Cutrale  40.7  40.9  35.1  34.7  30.4
Citrosuco
Paulista, SA  31.9  31.8  36.3  36.4  34.4
Cargill
Citrus, Ltda.  12.9  13.2  10.1  9.9  15.4
Frutesp, SA  6.6  6.4  5.2  5.7  9.5
Concentration
ratio  92.1  92.3  86.7  86.7  89.7
a. January-November.
I'. Six and one-half months of operation a year.
Source: Brazilian Foreign Trade Bureau; U.S. Department of Agriculture.
- 39  -Table 6.8 Orange production in Sao Paulo  1979/80-1989/90
Nonbeanng  Beating
trees  trees  Producton  Yeld
Season  (thousands)  (thousands)  (million bores-  (boxesa/tree)
1979/80  29.80  63.79  155  2.43
1980/81  31.08  67.53  170  2.52
1981/82  31.69  69.99  180  2.57
1982/83  30.28  74.34  195  2.62
1983/84  22.84  87.06  200  2.30
1984/85  26.13  86.24  205  2.38
1985/86  30.23  88.62  239  2.70
1986/87  33.43  91.96  220  2.39
1987/88  35.12  95.86  220  2.30
1988/89  40.51  99.23  210  2.12
1989l90  45.88  105.45  206  1.95
a. Ninety-pound boxes.
Source: Brown (1987) and FAO (1989b).
40  -Table 6.9 On-tree  orange prices, Sao Paulo and Florida
(U.S.  dollars  per box)
Floridal
Season  Sao Paulo  Florida  Sao Paulo
1975176  0.90  1.77  1.97
1976/77  0.85  2.17  2.55
1977178  2.00  4.14  2.07
1978179  1.72  4.65  2.70
1979/80  1.70  3.71  2.18
1980181  1.65  4.08  2.47
1981/82  2.12  4.28  2.02
1983/84  0.97  5.79  5.97
L984/85  2.10  7.75  3.69
1985/86  3.74  3.68  0.97
1986/87  1.15  4.69  4.08
1987/88  1.42  8.63  6.08
Note: Florida  production  season  is December  to November;  Brazil  production
season  is July through  June.
Sourc¢s:  Florida  Crop and Livestock  Reporting  Service,  Florida  Citrus  Mutual,  and
Institute  of Agricultural  Economics,  State of Sao Paulo.
- 41  -Table  610  Crrent  Import  1li  on ore  Juns  In selected mporins coutrkea
R  e#mkway  Poda  aa pdon  Inior  £aiff  Comuent
North Ameica
Canada  *  onnge julce  3 percent ad valomem  Most favored nation rates
*  blended orangegrapfuit  juioe  a  3 percent ad valorem
*  unsweetened omangegrapefit  free
concentrate
United States  *  nooncentrated  dtnrs juies  a  20 cents a galln  Imports from Caribbean
*  concentrated citns julces  *  35 cents a galon (on  Basin Initiative countries are
single-strength  equivalent)  eligible  for duty-free entry
Wesern Eurpe
BuMpean  *  ornge  juice of a density  a  42 perent  ad valorem  Preferencs for Algeria,
Community  exceeding 133 g/cm 3 at 200 C  Cyprus, srael, Morocco,
*  orange juice of a density of 133  *  19 percent plus additional  Tunisia, and Turkey
g/am 3 or less at 20P  C, of a  duty on sugar content  ACP free
value ewceeding  30 ECU/100  kg
Austria  coentrated  citms juices in  a  105 sdillngp  per 100
containers of 20 Uters  or more  kilograms
*  concentrated citrus juices in  a  420 schllling per 100
other containers  kiogams
Eastern Eurpe
Bulgaria  *  an citrus juices  *  IS percent ad valorem  Preferenes  for developing
countries Czechoslovakia  U  al citrus juice  a  3.75 percent ad valorem  Preferences for developing
countries Hungaty  *  al  citrus juices  *  20 percent ad valorem  Preferences for Cuba and
other developing  countries Poland  a all citrus  juices  *  S percent  ad valorem
Romania  mall citrus juices  *  40 percent ad valorem
Oter  developed
countries
Japan  *  orange juice, containing added  *  30 percent ad valorem
sugar (not more than 10
percent by weight of sucrose)
*  other orange juice  *  25 percent ad valorem
Austalia  o  orange juice  *  10 percent ad valorem plus  Ad valorem equivalent of
specific duty related to total  the composite duty was
soluble solids content and  about 30 percent in 1987
domestic support price
Near East
Dubai  a  imports by sea  a  3 percent ad valorem
a  imposts byn  air  a  2 percent ad valorem
Egypt  *  all citrus  juices  a  150 percent ad valorem
Saudi Arabia  all citrus  juices  a  7 percent ad valorem
Far Enst
Malaysia  a  all citms juices  a  25 percent ad valorem
Singapore  *  all citrus juice  *  free
Source: FAO (1989b).
- 42  -Notes
We would  like to thank  J. Adelino  Arantes  Filho,  who initiated  us into  the
complexities  of the  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  industry.  We also
gratefully  acknowledge  comments  and information  provided  by Aluisio  Campos,
Gary  N. Horlick,  J. Michael  Finger,  Leila  Frischtak,  Paul  M. Meo, R. Christian
Berg,  Sergio  Thompson-Flores,  and  participants  in a  World  Bank  workshop  on
Regulations  Against  Unfair  Imports:  Effects  on Developing  Countries.  The  views
expressed  in this  paper  are,  of course,  our own.
1. The  Brix scale  was developed  in the  nineteenth  century  by the  German
chemist  Adolf  F.W. Brix.  It measures  the  amount  of solids  (basically,  sugars)
that  are  diluted  in the  juice.  Freshly  squeezed  orange  juice  would  normally  be
at 12  degrees  Brix --  12  kilograms  of solids  for  every  hundred  kilograms  of
water.
2.For  details  on the  early  history  of the  Brazilian  citrus  industry,  see
Martinelli  (1987)  and  Hasse (1987).
3.Presently,  than  80 percent  of Brazil's  orange  groves  are  in Sao  Paulo.  In
the  northern  region  of the  state,  more than 145  million  trees  (about  70
percent  of them in  a fruit-bearing  stage)  cover  an area of about  52,000  square
kilometers.  The  trees  are owned  by some  25,000  growers,  and even  though  the
influence  of large  producers  has been  increasing  over  time,  orange  production
remains  quite  dispersed.  In the  early  1980s,  orange  groves  with a maximum  area
of 100  hectares  still  accounted  for  more than  40 percent  of the oranges
produced  in the  state.  This fragmented  structure  of production  for  oranges  is
in sharp  contrast  with the  highly  concentrated  structure  of the frozen
concentrate  industry,  a  fact  that  has given  rise  to the  "love-hate"
relationship  between  them.
4.Until  then,  West Germany  and  the  Netherlands  had  been the  main  markets  for
Brazilian  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice.  During  1970-76,  for  instance,  West
Germany  and  the  Netherlands  bought  31 and  20 percent,  respectively,  of
Brazilian  exports.
S. For further  details  see,  for  example,  Martone  and  Primo  Braga (1988).
6.Fiscal  incentives  for  reforestation  projects  were introduced  as a support
program  for  the  paper  and  pulp industry.  But since  the  original  regulations
did  not bar  the  use of these  resources  for  planting  fruit-bearing  trees,
orange  growers  were able  to use  this  program  to plant  9,000  hectareo  of
orangeries  between  .968  and 1976,  when this loophole  was closed.  For  further
details,  see  Hasse (1987,  205-6).
7.The  last  one  to disappear  was the  income  tax  exemption  on export  profits.  In
1989,  exporters  began  to pay a 3  percent  income  tax  on export-related  profits;
the  rate  was raised  to 6 percent  in 1990.
8.The  state  of Sao  Paulo  has  a  history  of support  to agricultural  research
that  goes  back to the 1930s.  This  research,  carried  on  by institutions  like
the  Instituto  Biologico,  was critical  to the  control  of several  diseases  that
afflicted  citrus  trees  (see  Hasse  1987).
9.The  investigation  by the  Conselho  Administrativo  de Defesa  Economica,  the
government  unit in charge  of controlling  abuses  of economic  power,  dismissed
the  charges  in 1981  (see  Hasse  1987,  249-50).
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11.The  Foreign  Trade  Bureau  was charged  with supervising  implementation  of the
agreement  (see  Duran  and  associates  1981).
12.The  economics  of U.S. imports  of frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  from
Brazil  are  detailed  by  Ward (1976).
13.Data  on the  changes  in the installed  capacity  of the  Brazilian  frozen
concentrated  orange  juice  industry  are frequently  reported  by Revista  Citrus.
14.U.N.,  International  Trade  Statistics  Yearbook  (various  issues).  Revealed
comparative  advantage  is defined  as  (X,,nIX.)  I  (X,,wlW"),  where  X 1,n  -
Brazilian  exports  of industry  i;  X.  - total  Brazilian  exports  of  manufactured
goods;  Xl,w = world exports  of industry  I; and  X.  - total  world  exports  of
manufactured  goods.
15.  The specific  duty  rate is applicable  to orange  juice  in its  natural  form.
For  concentrated  juice,  the  duty is levied  on the  number  of gallons  of
reconstituted  single-strength  juice  that  can  be produced  from  a gallon  of the
concentrate.
16.  The import  duty  on nonconcentrated  orange  juice  or reconstituted  juice
with a concentration  lower  than 1.5  is 20  cents  a gallon  (see  Hufbauer,
Berliner,  and  Elliot  1986,  100).
17.  Brazil  was subjected  to a higher  level  of antidumping  and  countervailing
duty  actions  per dollar  exported  than  most developing  countries  over the
1980s.  Finger  and  Messerlin  (1989,  6), for  instance,  have asserted  that  among
major  developing  country  exporters,  Brazil  "is  the  only  one  whose share  of
U.S. unfair  trade  cases  is far  above  its  share  of the  U.S. import  market;  7
percent  versus  2 percent"  for  the 1980-88  period.
18.  Unless  otherwise  stated,  the  information  on the  countervailing  duty
investigation  comes  from  USITC (1983,  1984).
19.  The  usual  forty-five  calendar-day  period  for  issuing  a preliminary
determination  was extended  in this  case,  which  was classified  as
"extraordinarily  complicated."
20.  This  estimate  was derived  as follows:  first,  the  amount  of financing
obtained  by producers  under  Resolution  674  was multiplied  by the  difference
between  prevailing  market  intereGt  rates  and  the  preferential  Resolution  674
rate.  This  result  was then  divided  by the  value  of exports  as a  proxy  for  the
ad  valorem  subsidy.  All calculations  were based  on data  for  fiscal  year 1981.
21.  The Brazilian  government,  by pursuing  a suspension  agreement,  was in
essence  buying  an "insurance  policy"  against  the  possibility  of a tougher
final  determination.
22.  The ITC  determination  was based  on a 1  to 1  vote,  with one  commissioner
finding  that  the  U.S. industry  was threatened  with  material  injury  by imports
of "subsidized"  Brazilian  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  and the  other
commissioner  dissenting.
23.  Unless  otherwise  stated,  information  on  antidumping  cases  was derived  from
USITC (1986,  1987,  1989)  and  Australian  Customs  Service  (1987).
- 44 -24.  Figures  are based  on information  provided  by U.S.  Department  of
Agriculture  reports  ("Brazil  Citrus")  and  Nartinelli  (1987).
25.  Over the  previous  five seasons,  the  ending  carryover  had averaged  39,600
metric  tons.
26.  The investigation  was based  on Cutrale's  and  Citrosuco's  sales  of frozen
concentrated  orange  juice  in the  U.S.  market  from  November  1, 1985,  through
April 30, 1986.  For  Citrosuco,  the  exporter's  sales  price (representing  the
U.S.  price)  was compared  with Citrosuco's  sales  to  Canada,  or constructed
values.  For  Cutrale,  purchase  price  figures  were used to represent  the  U.S.
price  and sales  in the  Brazilian  domestic  market  provided  the  benchmark  for
the  foreign-market  value.  For further  details,  see  USITC (1987,  R-2/R-3).
27.  See  Citrosuco  Paullsta  v. United  States,  12  CIT, 704  F. Supp.  1075  (1988).
28.  Citrosuco  Paulista  v.  United  States,  12  CIT, 704  F. Supp.  1085 (1988).  A
recent  decision  of the  U.S.  Court  of International  Trade,  however,  confirmed
the  interpretation  that  a petitioner  in antidumping  and  countervailing  duty
investigations  must "show  that  a  majority  of its  industry  supports  its
petition."  According  to some  analysts,  if the  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice
antidumping  case  were initiated  today,  Brazilian  companies  would  probably
achieve  better  results  using  the "majority  support"  argument.  Yet, it remains
to be seen  whether  this  new  interpretation  will be upheld  in the  courts.  For
details,  see  Suramerica  de  Aleaciones  Laminsdas,  C.A.  et  al.  v.  United  States
(Customs  Bulletin  and  Decisions  24, [September  1990]:  3-22).
29.  A recent  administrative  review  of the  antidumping  duty on frozen
concentrated  orange  juice  found  the  following  weighted  average  dumping  margins
for  the  period  May 1, 1988  through  April  30, 1989:  Citrosuco  Paulista,  S.A.,
0.06  percent;  Cargill  Citrus,  Ltda.,  Coopercitrus  Industrial  Frutesp,  S.A.,
and  Montecitrus  Trading,  S.A.,  zero.  Since  the  margins  found  were either  zero
or (in  the  case  of Citrosuco)  negligible,  cash  deposits  are  no longer  required
for  shipments  from these  manufacturers  as  of November  14,  1990  (see  USITC
1990).
30.  Australia's  highest  share  in  Brazil's  export  revenues  from  frozen
concentrated  orange  juice  was 2.47  percent,  reached  in 1983.
31.  The  concept  of NIFOB  is  consistent  with  Article  8 of the  GATT  Antidumping
Code,  which allows  the  duty  to be "less  than  the  margin,  if such  lesser  duty
would  be adequate  to remove  the injury  to the  domestic  industry."
32.  Since  August  1984,  the  subsidies  proivided  through  preferential  financing
for  exports  have  been significantly  reduced  as the  system  of export  credits
was privatized.  While  the  Foreign  Trade  Eureau  continued  to offer  an interest
rate equalization  plan --  financed  by Fundo  de Financiamento  a Exportacao,  a
Central  Bank fund --  that  provided  subsidized  loans  for  exporters,  the  system
collapsed  in 1988,  when its  resources  dried  up.  For further  details,  see  Piani
and  Pereira  (1990).
33.  It is  also important  to  note that  possibilities  for  international  price
arbitrage  exist,  despite  the  pervasiveness  of one-to-one  marketing
arrangements  between  Brazilian  producers  and  major  distributors  in the  United
States  and  Japan.  For  details  concerning  the  price  performance  of Brazilian
frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  in  European  markets,  see  Graham  (1987).
- 45  -34.  The  role  of  the  New  York  futures  market  in  terms  of  direct  international
price  arbitration  in frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  remains  limited,
however.  Only  a  small  proportion  of  worldwide  frozen  concentrate  transactions
are  intermediated  by  this  market,  which  is  dominated  by  Florida  producers
(physical  delivery  of  the  product  exclusively  to  Florida  ports  is  required).
For  further  details  on  the  functioning  of  the  futures  market  in  frozen
concentrated  orange  juice,  see  Ward  and  Kilmer  (1989).
35. For  a  theoretical  analysis  of  the  economic  rationales  for  dumping  see,
for  instance,  Deardorff  (1989).
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